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Abstract
We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-o¤s involved by the
introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main
determinants in a framework where public o¢ cials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using
data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by
the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and
enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests
that the program e¢ cacy is a¤ected by the judicial system e¢ ciency.
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1 Introduction
Since Becker (1968) organized crime has attracted considerable attention by economists, and for good
reasons. The di¤usion of criminal organizations, whose internal structure is built on cohesive and militarized
echelons, has forced governments all over the world to reform their legal and judicial systems to enhance
the performance of investigation agencies and to strengthen deterrence. These reforms have promoted the
approval of special laws that have radically changed conviction and imprisonment procedures.
A notable example is the introduction in many countries of accomplice-witness regulations (also known
as leniency programs), whose aim is to encourage former mobsters to blow the whistle and cooperate with
prosecutors in exchange of legal benets. The prevailing rationale for these polices rests largely on the
argument that the most culpable and dangerous criminals rarely do the dirty job. Even if these individuals
are primarily responsible for the crimes committed by their soldiers, they hardly get sentenced because their
role is typically conned to behind-the-scenes control and guidance. This explains why allowing low-tier
criminals to ip and turn informants seems a potentially key channel to ght organized crime.
Yet, so far, very few models have studied the basic trade-o¤s shaping the optimal design of cooperation
amnesties in criminal proceedings where whistleblowers and defendants belonged to the same organization
and have been in a principal-agent type of relationship. Moreover, despite the substantial economic costs
of these programs and the ethic concerns triggered by their approval, the evidence on their performance is
still quite limited.1
Why should lawbreakers be rewarded with lighter sanctions when they decide to blow the whistle and
cooperate with the justice? What are the key determinants of the amnesties they receive as a prize for
cooperation? What is the relationship between the costs and benets of accomplice-witnesses programs,
the hierarchical structure of criminal organizations, the e¢ ciency of the judicial system and the amount of
corruption in the economy? How did these programs perform in practice?
To address these issues we rst develop a model where (endogenous) legal benets are granted to ipping
criminals belonging to a hierarchical criminal organization in order to break down the code of silencethat
typically makes it hard to ght organized crime. Second, building upon the model main insights, we draw
a number of empirical predictions on the e¤ects of these programs that are tested by using the evidence
available for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witnesses program.
Hence, the paper builds on two main blocks. In the rst part, we analyze a simple model showing
that granting an amnesty to former criminals willing to cooperate with the justice has a clear economic
logic. We argue that two countervailing e¤ects contribute to determine these amnesties. On the one hand,
rewarding ipping criminals with lower punishments exacerbates conicts within criminal organizations.
More precisely, a more generous amnesty may induce criminals under investigation to cooperate more often,
thereby increasing the prosecution risk faced by their boss: this is the bright side of leniency programs. On
1See the related literature in Section 5.
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the other hand, it encourages the entry of new fellows into the illegal business by lowering their expected
sanction and thus the compensation that the boss has to secure them at the hiring stage. This e¤ect brings
out a potential dark side of leniency programs, whose strength depends upon several features of the criminal
organization such as, for instance, the degree of cohesion among its members, the boss retribution power, the
amount of corruption in the economy and the corroborating value of the whistleblowerstestimony.2 Building
on the interplay between these two e¤ects, we then show that an optimal policy  i.e., selected so as to
minimize crimes  reduces the crime rate and increases the conviction probability of the organization top
echelons. Moreover, the incentives to blow the whistle are determined, among other things, by the expected
conviction probability that a low-tier criminal faces when he does not cooperate and obeys to the code of
silence imposed by his partners. It is also shown that more generous amnesties (or even monetary rewards)
are necessary to ght organized crime when the judicial system is not very e¤ective, criminal organizations
feature strong internal cohesion between their members, the information provided by accomplice-witnesses
has a valuable investigative content and there exist strong external complicities between public o¢ cials and
criminal organizations (corruption).
In the second part of the paper we use the model predictions to guide an empirical investigation on
the accomplice-witness program introduced by the Italian parliament in the 1991 to ght the maas. The
unifying objective of our empirical investigation is twofold. First, we wish to provide evidence supporting
the idea that these programs are likely to produce benecial impact on deterrence and prosecution, which
can hopefully mitigate the political and ethical prejudice against them. Second, we wish to use the model
predictions together with the available evidence in order to better understand the forces that shape the
performance of such programs in practice.
Clearly, taking our theory to the data is a challenging endeavor mainly because of the lack of systematic
data (which is a common issue in this type of empirical work). Nevertheless, we believe that the overall
evidence collected points in the direction of the model main predictions. In particular, even if we cannot
perform a robust before and after analysis in terms of prosecution rates (mainly because, for the years
before the 1991, data are only available at aggregate level) we do nd strong evidence of a di¤erential trend
after the 1991 by comparing prosecution rates at province level for maas and other criminal organizations.
Moreover, we also nd evidence that the e¢ cacy of the program seems to be positively correlated with
e¢ ciency of the judicial system. Further predictions of the model accord with less systematic evidence. For
example, the model shows that high-powered incentives  i.e., very large amnesties and even monetary
rewards  are needed when criminal organizations exhibit strong internal cohesion, which might partly
explain why very few accomplices belong to the Calabrian Ndrangheta, whose members are mainly linked by
blood relationships. Finally, data suggest a novel positive correlation between the number of whistleblowers
entering the Italian program and the number of bosses convicted and jailed: a prediction that is peculiar to
our vertical hierarchy approach to criminal organizations.
Finally, although our theoretical construct is tied to the specic maa example, for which we were able
2 In contrast to our model where the dark side of leniency program is a feature emerging at the optimum, Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2006) discuss the e¤ects of badly designed leniency programs.
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to report empirical evidence, the scope of our conclusions has a wider appeal. Our model, for instance, can
be easily applied to study the impact of leniency policies in the ght against religious and political terrorism.
Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008) note that these organizations typically build their power on intimidation and
violence not only across their borders but also among their members: two key features of our model as
well. Notable examples where the use of insider information has greatly supported the prosecution activity
include the ght against the Italian Red Brigades, the German Baader-Meinhof, the US street gangs and
the more recent war against religious terrorism  e.g., organizations like Al Qaeda.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of organized crime and
accomplice-witness regulations in Italy, in addition to some preliminary and motivating evidence about the
deterrence e¤ect produced by the Italian leniency program on maa crimes. Section 3 sets up the theoretical
model and develops the main characterization results along with the comparative statics. In Section 4 we
take to the data some of the predictions of the theoretical model. Section 5 relates our work to the earlier
literature. Section 6 concludes. Proofs, data sources and denitions are in the Appendices.
2 The Italian experience
In this section we discuss some preliminary evidence about the Italian accomplice-witness regulation. The
objective is to better understand the main roots of the Italian leniency program and use this evidence to
guide the theoretical construct developed in Section 3.
2.1 Criminal organizations and leniency in Italy
In 1982, the Italian Legislator, recognizing the pervasive role of maa-type criminal associations, introduced
the article 416-bis of the Penal Code, which denes a maa association as characterized by the exploitation
of the force of intimidation of the associative tie and of the condition of subjugation and silence (omertà)
which derives from itand makes it a crime o¤ense to belong to a maa family.3
From 1982 to 2001, the new o¤ence led to the convictions of 5,443 Italian citizens. Data at regional level
show that 5,069 individuals, that is, more than 93% of the convicted mobsters, were sentenced in 4 out of
the 20 Italian regions: Sicily and Campania exhibit the highest number of convictions, followed by Puglia
and Calabria (Table 1). These regions (hereafter core-regions) have historically been troubled by di¤erent
maa groups: the Camorra in Campania, the Ndrangheta in Calabria, the Sacra Corona Unita (SCU) in
Puglia, and the Maa in Sicily. Each group consists of a number of maa associations, the most famous
being Cosa Nostra in Sicily.
Insert Table 1 here
3Many o¤ences correspond to the illicit activity of criminal associations (for instance, drug tra¢ c, loan sharking, murder,
and extortion). However, the maa association o¤ence refers specically to the use of fear through the force of intimidation by
the entire organization. Thus, a common crime o¤ence such as extortion is sentenced in a di¤erent way when it is committed
through maa intimidation. Moreover, even a licit goal may be prosecuted if it is achieved through the force of subjugation.
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The strength of the Italian maa associations, as well as their increasing inuence on the legal economic
activity, rest on a di¤use external complicity, namely, special relationships between criminal heads and
public o¢ cials such as national or local politicians, judges, local administrators and members of the police
force (Dickey, 2004). In order to break down omertà and weaken these external complicities, the Italian
Legislator decided to set harsher punishments for maa a¢ liates and, at the same time, to grant full or
partial amnesty to whistleblowers who provide information leading to further maa prosecutions or revealing
external complicities: the Italian accomplice-witness program (D.L. 13/05/1991 n. 152). In the same year
the Legislator also introduced a protection program, aimed at protecting those who endanger themselves
because of the information provided to the judicial authority (D.L. 15/01/1991 n. 8).
Insert Table 2 here
Table 2 reports the 2008 distribution of former maa accomplices who took part in the protection
program (they are grouped on the basis of the criminal association they provided information about). On
the whole, 729 out of 833 accomplices  i.e., 87% of the total  provided relevant information on the four
mostly known maa groups; the Sicilian maa and the Camorra are each concerned by roughly one third of
dissociates. Table 2 also shows that 93% of the proceeds conscated concern the Camorra, Sicilian maa,
Ndrangheta, and SCU. As for the number of accomplices, the Camorra and the Sicilian maa are those
mostly a¤ected by the conscation laws.
2.2 Buscetta meets Falcone: the emergence of accomplice-witnesses
Tommaso Buscetta is widely recognized as the rst important criminal breaking the code of silence in
Italy. During the 1980s he helped the judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino to achieve signicant
successes in the ght against organized crime. He was the key witness in the Maxi Trial that sent almost 350
Maa members to prison. In particular, Buscetta exposed the existence and the workings of the Sicilian
Maa Commission.4 His cooperation enabled Falcone to argue that Cosa Nostra was a unied hierarchical
structure ruled by a Commission, and that its leaders could be held responsible for the criminal activities
committed to benet the organization. This premise became known as the Buscetta theoremand was at
the root of the Maxi Trial sentence in January 1992. His testimony in the New York Pizza Connection
Trialin the mid-1980s also enabled the conviction of hundreds of mobsters in Italy and the United States.
As a reward for his help, Buscetta was allowed to live in the USA under a new identity in the Witness
Protection Program.
Until the 1990s, few pentiti, albeit signicant ones, followed Buscettas example. This changed signif-
icantly when, thanks to the intense activity of Falcones investigative group (the so-called pool Antimaa),
the Italian Legislator introduced in 1991 the accomplice-witness protection program. Since then, over a
thousand maosi have agreed to collaborate with Italian justice.
4The Commission was a body of leading Maa members deciding on important questions concerning the actions of, and
settling disputes within the Sicilian Maa.
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Several other features are worth noting. First, accomplices rarely decided to blow the whistle before
being under investigation. Second, strikingly enough, many among the most inuential maa heads never
cooperated with the justice, even if being charged with several life sentences. For instance, Ra¤aele Cutolo,
Luciano Liggio, Bernardo Provenzano, Totò Riina and Francesco Schiavone, repeatedly refused any collab-
oration with prosecutors in order to protect  or so they claimed  their status of man of honor. Finally,
the program poorly performed in Calabria, where at the end of 2008, only 95 former Ndrangheta a¢ liates
were in the protection program. The Ndrangheta thus seems to feature a greater cohesion than Cosa Nostra
and the Camorra, which can be related to di¤erences in recruitment methods. The Ndrangheta recruits
members on the criterion of blood relationships, which results in a tight cohesion within the family clan
that presents a major obstacle to investigations (Paoli, 2003).
2.3 Accomplice-witness and maa trials
The rst important Italian trial against the Sicilian Maa opened in 1967 and concerned its growing in-
volvement in the heroin trade. The trial ended one year later with the acquittal of all defendants. In the
same period, judge Cesare Terranova sent to trial 114 defendants, with the view that the crimes and those
accused of carrying them out were all linked and should be treated as an organized body. The defendants
were accused of crimes relating to the rst maa war, with charges including multiple murder, kidnapping,
tobacco smuggling, theft, public massacre and organized crime  see, e.g., Gambetta (1992). The trial
lasted for a year and resulted in only ten convictions, several of which being only for organized crime.5
The third trial began in February 1969. There were sixty-four defendants, all from the town of Corleone
(Sicilia). The charges related to a maa war in Corleone that started in 1958, and resulted in over fty
murders. There was signicant evidence tampering during the trial, which experienced the rst public intim-
idation act. All sixty-four defendants were acquitted. Whilst there was undoubtedly witness intimidation
and evidence tampering, much of the evidence was fairly thin. There were no pentiti at the time and few
non-Maosi willing to risk death by testifying for the prosecution.
During the early 1980s, a period known as the second maa war started, resulting in hundreds of murders,
including several high-prole public authorities. The growing public revulsion at such killings provided the
necessary premise to the Palermo Maxi Trial, whose preliminary phase was headed by judges Giovanni
Falcone and Paolo Borsellino. Never before so many Maosi were on trial at the same time in Italy. A total
of 474 defendants were facing charges, which included 120 murders, drug tra¢ cking, extortion, and, under
the new law, being a member of the Maa. Most of the crucial evidence came from the rst two important
whistleblowers: Tommaso Buscetta and Salvatore Contorno. The trial ended on December 1987, almost two
years after its beginning. Of the 474 defendants 360 were convicted; 2,665 years of prison sentences were
5Before 1967 people did not even recognize the existence of Cosa Nostra, while in reality this organization developed and
settled since the early 1900. While the economic origins of the maa(s) remain relatively unexplored, Bandiera (2003) o¤ers
an interesting theory and some empirical evidence about the development of the maa in the west of Sicily. More recently,
Buonanno et al. (2012) extend the data and the scope of the empirical analysis to study the di¤erence in the incidence of the
maa between eastern and western part of the island.
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shared out between the guilty, not including the life sentences handed to the nineteen leading Maa bosses
and killers.
The major Italian trial against organized crime not involving Sicilian mobsters was the Spartacus Maxi
Trial, which was specically directed against the activities of the powerful Casalesi association of the
Camorra and its boss Francesco Schiavone. The trial lasted for ten years (July 1998 - June 2008) and
charged 36 members of the clan with a series of murders and other crimes. All were found guilty and 16
sentenced to life imprisonment, including the Casalesi head Francesco Schiavone and his chief lieutenant,
Francesco Bidognetti. More than 500 witnesses and 25 informants testied in the trial, which ended with
a total of 700 years of imprisonment and nearly 6 billions euros conscated (Anselmo and Braucci, 2008).
Very recently a large number of people has been arrested because of being part of the Casalesi association
mainly thanks to information provided by whistleblowers.
3 The model
Building on the insights o¤ered by the historical evidence discussed above, in this section we set-up and
derive the equilibrium outcome of a game where the Legislator strategically designs a leniency program to
disseminate conict between the members of a hierarchical criminal organization.
Players and environment: The game involves a benevolent Legislator, a criminal organization and a
continuum of public o¢ cials. The Legislator, having forbidden welfare reducing criminal acts, designs an
accomplice-witness program. For simplicity, the criminal organization is formed by two mobsters: a boss
(the principal) and a fellow (the agent) which are in a principal-agent type of relationship (in the Appendix
we consider a model with a multi-agents organization). The boss is the mind of the organization, who plans
the crime; the agent is the arm, who materially commits the illegal act.6 Public o¢ cials, either prosecutors
or members of the police force, inuence the probability of convicting a defendant.
The crime yields a revenue R, which is stochastic and distributed over the compact support [0; R]
according to the cumulative distribution function F (R). The principal hires the agent after having observed
the realization of R; he has full bargaining power and makes a take-it or leave-it o¤er, which entails a wage
w paid by the principal to the agent after the crime is committed, but before the investigation takes place.
For simplicity, we normalize the agents outside option to zero.
Prosecution: Committing the crime triggers an investigation with probability . We assume that two
types of public o¢ cials may be in charge of the judicial and investigative process. Building on the historical
evidence discussed in Section 2, we assume that there are honest o¢ cials, which do not have links with the
criminal group, and thus always seek to convict the mobsters under investigation, and dishonest o¢ cials,
which are instead ready to acquit the defendants whenever possible. There is an overall measure 1 of o¢ cials
6At the bottom of the chain of command, the picciotti donore, or soldiers, are expected to perform tasks with blind obedience
until they are promoted to the next level, where they will be granted command over their own group of soldiers. See, e.g., Dickey
(2004).
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in the economy, a fraction  of which is honest. The o¢ cials type is observed only by the principal but not
by the agent, who is unaware of the hidden links between his head and law-enforcers.7
The parameter  reects the inuenceof the organization on prosecutors and, therefore, it a¤ects the
e¢ ciency of the judicial system. It might be determined not only by aggregate factors  such as economic,
institutional and technological conditions  but it is also often linked to local factors such as cultural
diversity and specic features of the criminal organizations operating in a given area.
Hence, dishonest types can be either interpreted as linked to the criminal organization for cultural and
personal reasons or as being bribed or intimidated. Criminal organizations indeed frequently tried to ma-
nipulate court decisions by bribing, threatening, and, occasionally, even murdering judges and prosecutors.
Tommaso Buscetta was the rst to expose in detail the secret exchanges that linked politicians to the Sicilian
maa. On November 1992, he testied in front of the Antimaa Commission about the links between Cosa
Nostra and Salvo Lima, indicating Lima as the politician to whom Cosa Nostra turned most often to resolve
problems for the organization whose solution laid in Rome. Bruno Contrada, a former head of the Italian
Intelligence Agency, was sentenced to ten years for collusion with Cosa Nostra. He was accused of informing
the Sicilian maa on upcoming police operations, preventing in particular an early capture of the fugitive
Totò Riina (Audizione del collaboratore di giustizia Gaspare Mutolo, Antimaa Commission, February
9, 1993). For simplicity, here we do not explicitly model the corruption and the intimidation process that
generates the o¢ cials type.8
Legal regimes:
 No leniency: if the public o¢ cial is honest, the agent is convicted with probability p and bears
a sanction Sa, whereas the principal is convicted with probability  6 p and bears the sanction
Sp. Hence, convicting the crime instigator is harder than convicting the soldier (who has materially
committed the crime). Otherwise, both mobsters are acquitted.9
 Leniency: when the investigation starts, the agent can opt to blow the whistle and cooperate with
the justice, which requires a testimony at trial against his boss. The reward for this cooperation is
a reduction by  of the sanction Sa. If the agent cooperates, the boss bears the sanction Sp with
probability  > , regardless of the o¢ cials type.10 In practice, to obtain a conviction the witness
testimony needs corroboration from unrelated sources; we can therefore interpret  as a measure of
7The available historical evidence o¤ers ample support for this hypothesis. For instance, security concerns have led to the
creation in the Ndrangheta of a secret society within the secret society: La Santa. Membership in the Santa is only known to its
members. Bosses belonging to the Santa have precisely the objective of establishing close connections with state representatives,
and simple soldiers are unaware of these connections. Assuming that the o¢ cials type is observed by both the principal and
the agent would not add new key insights to our analysis, however. In that case, the agents reporting strategy would depend
on the o¢ cials type (only when the o¢ cial is honest would the agent possibly report evidence against the boss) but the basic
insight would be similar: a more lenient policy makes agents facing honest o¢ cials more willing to cooperate.
8An earlier version of the paper formally introduced a bribingstage to determine the fraction of dishonest o¢ cials. The
main comparative statics were qualitatively the same.
9Although p may capture economic and institutional conditions, it cannot pin down factors such as cultural diversity and
specic features of the criminal organizations, which are suitably captured by .
10We assume that a dishonest o¢ cial can no longer manipulate the trial when the agent cooperates. This is consistent with
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the reliability of the informant. This parameter may for example reect the status of the informant in
the organization or its proximity to the leader: mobsters at a higher level in the hierarchy constitute
a better source of information than simple soldierswho execute orders blindly. Finally, in the light
of the evidence reported in Section 2, we rule out the possibility that the boss talks as well as the
possibility that the agent decides to cooperate before an investigation is opened.
Trial-reluctance, cohesion and retaliation: In order to model conict within the organization in a
simple way, we assume that the agent is reluctant to face a trial, which translates into a private cost .11
This parameter is drawn from a compact support [; ], according to the atomless and twice continuously
di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function G (). The agent learns  when an investigation is opened.12
For example,  can reect the psychological costs resulting from the fear and apprehension of imprisonment,
which materialize when the agent is about to face the trial;13 or, it might reect the emotional costs the
mobster incurs when he realizes either the danger to which his children are exposed, or the consequences of
the Maa stigmata. As observed by judge Falcone in his last interview (1991), the willingness to cooperate
may also reect an unanticipated low degree of trust and cohesion inside the organization. For example,
internal ghts between formerly allied clans and partners (see, e.g., also Gambetta, 1992, pg. 162) might
encourage the losers to have their revenge by cooperating with the justice.14
We also assume that criminal organizations seek to punish whistleblowers, a feature that we model as a
retaliation loss L su¤ered by the informant. The ability of a witness to give testimony in a judicial setting
or to cooperate with law enforcement investigations without fear of intimidation or reprisals is essential.
Increasingly, countries are enacting legislation or adopting policies to protect witnesses whose cooperation
with law enforcement authorities or testimony in a court of law would endanger their lives or those of their
relatives. Accordingly, we shall interpret a lower value of the loss L as the result of better witness protection
programs or as a weaker retribution power of the organization.15
Timing: We follow the literature in assuming that the Legislator moves rst.16 The sequence of events is
the evidence discussed in Section 2.3, which underlines the di¤erence in the results of maa trails with and without pentiti
(arguably with a constant fraction of disloyal o¢ cials). Moreover, the main trade-o¤ is still at work if one assumes that the
measure of corrupted o¢ cials reduces the chance that the boss is incriminated, but this reduction is not too large.
11The idea that the decision to cooperate or not depends on the interim stochastic realization of a parameter is also made in
Harrington (2008) who allows the probability of discovery and successful prosecution of a cartel to change over time.
12The analysis applies unchanged if the uncertainty realizes before any investigation but the principal cannot use revelation
mechanisms that condition the wage on the agents type.
13 In maa trials the imprisonment of defendants is often mandatory even before the denitive verdict for precautionary
reasons. And the trial can be very long depending on the importance of the charges and the number of defendants (the
Spartacus Maxi Trial, for example, lasted ten years).
14The idea that leniency programs can act as anticipated threatswithin criminal organization has been also studied in the
collusion literature  see, e.g., Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) and Spagnolo (2000) for a static analysis, and Ellis and Wilson
(2001) for its dynamic extension. As we will see, in our model leniency does not play the role of a threat given that the agent
has no bargaining power. Introducing such additional e¤ect into the analysis would not change the main qualitative insights,
but it would only strengthen the dark side of leniency.
15For simplicity we assume that this loss is exogenous. At the end of this section we explain why our conclusions would not
change were this choice endogenous.
16See e.g. Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2003) and Rey (2003).
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as follows:
t=0 The Legislator decides whether to launch a leniency program and accordingly commits to an amnesty
rate .
t=1 Uncertainty about R resolves and the principal decides whether to commit the crime; if it chooses not
to commit the crime, the game ends, otherwise the principal pays the wage w to the agent once the
crime is committed and the game then proceeds to the investigation stage.
t=2 An investigation opens with probability . The public o¢ cial in charge of the case is honest with
probability  and dishonest with probability 1  . The type of the public o¢ cial is not observed by
the agent.
t=3 The agent learns his personal costs of facing the trial () and, if a leniency program is in place,
decides whether to blow the whistle. Depending on the legal regime, the trial uncertainty resolves,
and sanctions (including the retaliation loss) are imposed.
In the Appendices we provide a detailed illustration of the game tree.
Actions and equilibrium concept: An action prole for the principal involves a wage o¤er w. An action
prole for the agent involves a participation rule, based on the wage o¤ered, and a confession decision 
i.e., whether to cooperate or not, which will depend on his type . The Legislator simply announces . We
shall look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this game.
Technical assumptions: For ease of exposition we will maintain the following conditions:
A1 Monotone hazard rate. Let h ()  (1 G ()) =g () denote the inverse hazard rate, then:
 > 0 ) h () < h  0 : (A1)
As shown in Appendix 1, A1 ensures that the Legislators program is single-peaked. It is adopted in
many economic applications and satised by standard distributions.17
A2 Cooperation.
h () >
 
   Sp: (A2)
This condition rules out the uninteresting case where no agent ever talks in equilibrium. It can be easily
satised by standard distribution functions.
Finally, following the literature, all sanctions will be interpreted as the monetary equivalent of the im-
prisonment terms, nes, damages, and so forth, to which the criminals expose themselves. This assumption
is made only for exposition purposes. Our insights readily extend to non-monetary sanctions.
17For instance, the uniform distribution satises A1.
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3.1 Equilibrium characterization
We now characterize the equilibrium of the game. We shall rst consider the no leniency case before
introducing leniency.
3.1.1 No leniency
We consider rst the subgame with no leniency. If an investigation opens, the agent must face the trial.
The principals expected gain is then:
v = R  w   Sp;
where w is the expected wage paid by the principal; this expected wage will be set so as to compensate the
agent for his participation into the criminal business:
w = pSa + E[]; (1)
where E[] is the expected cost that the agent bears from the trial, while pSa is the agents expected
sanction.
The principal will decide to go on with the crime if and only if the return R is larger than the expected
costs, that is:
R > Rn   (pSa + Sp) + E [] :
The crime is less protable, the higher is the probability that an investigation is opened ( large), the more
severe and e¢ cient the prosecution system (p, Sa and Sp large), the larger the fraction of honest o¢ cials (
large) and the higher the agents expected cost from the trial or the lower the cohesion between the members
of the organization (E[] large). In the absence of leniency, the economy crime rate is thus given by:
rn = Pr(R > Rn) = 1  F (Rn):
We shall see below how the possibility of launching a leniency program a¤ects this rate.
3.1.2 Leniency
In this section we derive the optimal leniency policy using a simple backward-induction logic. Once an
investigation is launched, not cooperating exposes the agent to the cost of the trial, , and to an expected
sanction, pSa; in contrast, cooperating reduces the sanction to (1  )Sa, but exposes the agent to the
retaliation loss, L. Hence, the agents payo¤ are:
u =
(
  (1  )Sa   L if he cooperates,
 pSa    if he does not.
(2)
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He will therefore cooperate as long as his type  is larger than a threshold, b (), equal to:
b ()  (1    p)Sa + L: (3)
The expression of the threshold shows that the agent is keener to talk the more generous the amnesty
rate, , the higher the proportion of honest o¢ cials in the economy, , and the more e¤ective the prosecution
stage, as measured by p. Cooperation is also more attractive when leniency is complemented with an e¤ective
witness protection program that reduces the loss from retaliation, L.
The leniency rate  thus determines the cooperation threshold b. Without loss of generality we can
restrict attention to b 2 [; ]; indeed, any program leading to b >  is ine¤ective (and formally equivalent tob = ), whereas any program leading to b <  is too generous: compared with b = , it reduces further the
expected sanction from committing a crime (by o¤ering a reduction  exceeding what is needed to convince
all types of agent to cooperate), without any o¤setting benet in terms of cooperation (since all types of
agent cooperate anyway). Conversely, for any b 2 ; , the agents participation constraint can be written
as:
u = w   
"Z 
b ((1  )Sa + L) dG () +
Z b

(pSa + ) dG ()
#
> 0:
Clearly, this constraint will be binding, so that the equilibrium wage makes the agent just indi¤erent
between committing the crime and enjoying his reservation utility, that is:
w(b) = "Z b ((1  )Sa + L) dG () +
Z b

(pSa + ) dG ()
#
=  (pSa + E[])  
Z 
b (   b)dG () :
The last term illustrates the dark side of leniency: by reducing the expected sanction from committing the
crime, it allows the boss to o¤er a lower wage and thus makes the criminal activity more protable. The
bright side of the leniency program comes from the increased likelihood of prosecution: whenever the agent
is su¢ ciently reluctant to face a trial ( > b), his cooperation with the justice increases the probability of
successfully prosecuting the boss from  to . As a result, the principals expected sanction is now equal
to:
C(b) = Sp +  Z b (   )SpdG () :
The principals expected utility from the criminal activity is now given by:
v = R  w(b)  C(b):
We assume that the Legislator sets the amnesty rate , or equivalently the cooperation threshold b =b (), so as to minimize the crime rate  this seems to be the objective function that politicians and
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prosecutors supporting the introduction of the program had in mind (see, e.g., Falcone, 1991). Formally,
the crime rate is
rl = 1  F (Rl(b));
where Rl(b) is the revenue threshold above which the criminal activity is protable:
Rl(b)  w(b) + C(b) = Rn +  Z b
h
(   )Sp   (   b)i dG () :
The Legislatorprogram thus amounts to solve:
L : maxb2[;]Rl(b):
Letting h ()  (1 G ()) =g () denote the inverse hazard rate, we have:
Proposition 1 Under A1 and A2, the Legislators program L has a unique solution, b = b (), that is
interior and characterized by the rst-order condition:
h(b) = (   )Sp: (4)
The rst-order condition (4) reects the balance between the bright and dark sides of leniency. On
the one hand, increasing the amnesty  reduces the agents expected sanction for the 1 G(b) agents who
apply for leniency; this makes running criminal activities less costly for the principal. On the other hand, a
higher amnesty convinces g(b) additional agents to cooperate with the justice, increasing the probability of
convicting the principal, whereby stiing his incentive to engage in criminal activities.
This trade-o¤ shows that it is always optimal to adopt a leniency program: starting from b = ,
an increase in , inducing a small reduction in b, generates a benet in terms of enhanced likelihood
of prosecution, without any o¤setting cost in terms of reduced sanctions  since no agent was initially
applying for leniency. By construction, this implies that, compared with the benchmark case of no leniency:
 the probability of convicting the principal is increased, by (   )(1 G(b));
 the principals expected costs is also higher, and the crime rate is lower: rl < rn.
The next proposition discusses the main drivers of the optimal policy:
Proposition 2 The optimal policy is such that:
 the fraction of agents who cooperate, as well as the amnesty rate:
 increases with the quality of the evidence provided by the informant, , or the sanction for the principal,
Sp;
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 decreases when the fraction of honest o¢ cials, , or the probability of convicting the boss, , increase;
 in addition, the amnesty rate:
 increases with the retaliation loss L;
 decreases when the probability of convicting the agent, p, increases;
 increases with the agents sanction Sa if  is lower than the probability of acquittal in case of trial,
1  p; the converse holds otherwise.
The amnesty program should be more generous, the more e¤ective is the evidence provided by the
informant for convicting the boss of the criminal organization, the less likely the boss would be convicted
in the absence of cooperation and the harsher the punishment for the boss. Indeed, all these parameters
increase the value of cooperation, measured by the deterrence factor ( )Sp. Also, in order to maintain an
appropriate level of cooperation, higher amnesty rates are needed to o¤set an increase in the retaliation loss,
L, which is a technologicalmeasure of the organizations military power, or a decrease in the probability
of convicting the agent, p, which is instead a measure of the e¢ ciency and honesty of the legal system
and its actors. Note, in particular, that an increase in the proportion of honest o¢ cials calls for reducing
the amnesty rate, since a higher  fosters cooperation but lowers its deterrence factor. Finally, the impact
of the agents sanction Sa on the optimal policy depends on the e¤ect that harsher sanctions produce on
the agents propensity to cooperate. If the optimal amnesty  is lower than the probability of acquittal
1 p, increasing the sanction Sa discourages cooperation; the Legislator must then counterbalance this by
increasing the amnesty rate. Otherwise, the opposite result obtains.
Theory and Evidence: These results provide a number of empirical predictions, which can be explained in
light of the historical and anecdotal evidence discussed in Section 2.
Judge Falcones whole experience, his strict collaboration with Buscetta and the generous legal and
economic benets that were granted to the earlier whistleblowers are all facts that are consistent with the
conclusion that the amnesty rate and the optimal number of whistleblowers should increase the lower the
probability of convicting the boss in the absence of insider information is  i.e., as reected by a lower
. This result is also supported by the historical evidence discussed in Section 2.3, where it is argued that
convicting a boss has been very hard, if not impossible, before the introduction of the Italian accomplice-
witness program. The same facts altogether are also clearly consistent with the prediction that the legal
benets as well as the optimal number of informants should increase with the quality of information released
by the agent  which is reected by a larger . In addition the positive e¤ect of a stronger retaliation power
on the optimal amnesty also seems to be corroborated by the historical evidence  e.g., this is exemplied
by Buscettas experience discussed in Section 2.2. The need of granting higher amnesties in areas where
corruption is more widespread  i.e., lower   can be instead captured by the Ndrangheta example.
Historically, this organization features a very large number of members relative to the Calabrian population
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size. Prosecutors have often argued that in this area corruption is the normand not an exception since
in many Calabrian villages nearly all citizens belong to the organization. Hence, many among politicians
and prosecutors have claimed that more aggressive leniency policies would be needed to achieve acceptable
results in this region  see, e.g., Forgione (2008).
Concerning the link between the determinants to whistle and the e¢ ciency of the legal system, the
prediction of our model is that the higher is the perceivedacquittal probability, 1   p, the lower is the
number of ipping criminals: an insight that seems to be corroborated by the empirical evidence reported
and interpreted in Section 4.3.
Moreover, taken together, the main theoretical predictions of the model also imply that after the in-
troduction of the accomplice-witness program, more maa crimes should be under scrutiny of prosecutors,
thanks to the information provided by former accomplices: a prediction that appears to be in line with the
empirical evidence presented in Section 4.2.
A Remark on Rewards: As discussed in Section 2, the anti-Maa programs not only o¤er leniency to infor-
mants, but often also secure them stable wages, health insurance, housing and other nancial supports. It
is therefore interesting to see when it is optimal to grant rewards (that is,  > 1).
To address this question, suppose that the parameter  is uniformly distributed over a support

  ; .
A2 then requires  >
 
   Sp and the rst-order condition (4) becomes:
 = 1  p+ (   )Sp + L  
Sa
: (5)
A simple inspection of this condition yields:
Proposition 3 Suppose that  is uniformly distributed over

  ; ; it is then optimal to o¤er a reward
 i.e.,  > 1  whenever  > (   )Sp and:
L   > pSa   (   )Sp: (6)
It is therefore optimal to reward accomplices when the criminal organization exhibits a strong internal
cohesion ( low); this is, for instance, the case of organizations such as the Calabrian Ndrangheta, whose
members are mainly linked by blood relationships. The same applies for L large  i.e., organizations that
are powerful on the military side and are therefore more violent when punishing whistleblowers.
Since the threshold is decreasing in , this is also more likely to be the case when the informants
testimony is highly reliable, as exemplied by the case of Tommaso Buscetta, the rst important pentito,
who was allowed to live in the USA under a new identity in the Witness Protection Program after his
testimony in the New York Pizza Connection Trialin the mid-1980s.
As noted above, the necessity of rewarding whistleblowers was already discussed in Spagnolo (2003) and
Rey (2003). What is new here with respect to both these papers is the link between internal cohesion of
maa organizations and rewards, a prediction that is supported by the evidence discussed in Section 2.
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Extensions: We conclude the section by discussing some extensions of the simple model analyzed so far.
First, a natural way to make the analysis more realistic is to consider a criminal organization that is
composed by one boss and more soldiers, each owning information that can be used by the judicial authority
to convict the boss. This scenario is analyzed in the Appendix, where we consider a model with two agents
that jointly commit the crime and non-cooperatively choose whether to cheat the boss. We show that, in
addition to the dark and bright side of leniency already highlighted above, there are two new forces that
shape the optimal amnesty in this context. On the one hand, dealing with two whistleblowers induces the
Legislator to be less lenient vis-à-vis each of them (relative to the single-soldier organization analyzed so far).
This is because, ceteris paribus, the probability of cheating is higher in large organizations than in small ones,
which relaxes the tension between the bright and the dark side of leniency. In other words, the members of
a multi-agent organization are more willing to talk than in the single-soldier case because they fear that if
they dont, their peers might do so. Hence, everything else being held constant, the endogenous uncertainty
of a multi-agent model strengthens the bright side of leniency and reduces the optimal amnesty. On the
other hand, though, if the information that these agents own features a high degree of complementarity
 i.e., if the chance of convicting the boss when two members of the organization cheat is much larger
than under a single defection  the Legislator needs to become more lenient, by granting a larger amnesty,
because it is in its best interest to have both criminals talking rather than just one.
Second, in the paper we assume (for simplicity) that corrupted o¢ cials are passive. However, the bright
side of leniency weakens when one considers the case in which corrupted o¢ cials help the organization to
better retaliate on cheaters  i.e., by enhancing the probability of retaliation. In this case, the higher is
the corruption rate, the less incentive criminals have to talk.
Third, throughout, we considered an exogenous retaliation loss and we assumed that the agent does
not observe the o¢ cials type. Both these restrictions can be easily relaxed. The retaliation loss can be
endogenized by assuming that intimidating the agent is costly  e.g., perhaps because it requires e¤ort
provision by the boss that could be protably supplied in other tasks  but may entail future reputation
benets: an organization punishing very harshly whistleblowers today might prevent future defections.
The trade-o¤ between costs and benets of an endogenous retaliation loss is then clear and can be easily
accommodated in our framework with no loss of insights. The same conclusion applies if one assumes that
the agent is aware of the o¢ cials type at the time he chooses whether to cooperate. As already noted
before, in this scenario the agent cooperates only if the o¢ cial is honest, but the logic of the model does not
change. The main trade-o¤ is still at work if one assumes that the measure of corrupted o¢ cials reduces
the chance that the boss is incriminated.
Of course, many other interesting extensions remain to be explored. We kept theses issues aside in order
to compare in the clearest possible way the main models predictions with the evidence, but hope to take
these further steps in future research.
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4 Empirical evidence
In this section we argue that the main predictions of the theoretical model developed above appear to be
corroborated by the evidence available for Italy. As the antitrust literature, our model predicts a positive
correlation between deterrence, prosecution rates and the introduction of a leniency policy. Hence, to begin
with, we show that the Italian accomplice-witnesses policy engendered a sensible reduction of maa related
crimes (see Section 4.1). Then, we document an increasing trend in prosecution rates of maa related crimes,
a pattern that is not present when looking at prosecution rates of similar but not maa related crimes (see
Section 4.2). Finally, our model also o¤ers two predictions that are peculiar to the ght against organized
crime. First, the leniency program creates a shift of prosecutions towards higher echelons of the organization
 i.e., when a soldier talks, the boss is more likely to fall (see Section 4.2). Second, the e¢ cacy of the
program hinges upon the e¢ ciency of the judicial system, a conclusion consistent with Fyfe and Sheptycki
(2006) and Cassidy (2008) (see Section 4.3). In the following we provide evidence also supporting these two
specic predictions.
4.1 Deterrence
Since illegal acts do not take place in broad daylight, providing evidence about the e¤ects of new reforms is
typically a complex endeavor. For instance, the number of prosecuted crimes might not tell much about the
deterrence power of a reform: a policy that deters crimes but that, at the same time, increases the fraction
of those that are successfully prosecuted, will have an ambiguous impact on the number of prosecuted
crimes. As a consequence, a successful policy, which completely deters crime, might be indistinguishable
from an ine¤ective policy with very low detection.18 In the case of criminal organizations, however, data on
murders can partly overcome this measurement obstacle. In fact, almost all murders are uncovered  i.e.,
the number of reported murders reects that of committed ones.19
Arguably, maa-related murders also provide a proxy for the volume of the organized crime business
 i.e., a variable that pertains more closely to our model. The historical evidence does suggest that the
number of maa-related murders is positively correlated with the expansion of organized crime activity.
Many among the most important maa wars originated either by the emergence of new illicit tra¢ cs or
by the unexpected increase of state aids to the infrastructureand building sectors.20 For instance, in
Sicily the war that decimated several Sicilian maa clans in the early 1980s, started when the group lead
by Luciano Liggio  i.e., the so called corleonesi took over the new business created by the expanding
heroin trade and the real estate boom around the city of Palermo. Similarly, in Campania during the second
half of the 1970s the group lead by Ra¤aele Cutolo decimated most of the older Camorra clans. Cutolo and
his fellows took over the illicit tra¢ cs stemming from the huge increase in unauthorized tobacco smuggling
18This issue typically arises in the empirical literature on antitrust law enforcement  see, e.g., Brenner (2009), Harrington
and Chang (2009) and Miller (2009).
19Pinotti (2011) exploits the fact that under-reporting is negligible for homicides to examine the di¤usion of the maa in the
southern Italian regions of Apulia and Basilicata over the last thirty years. On this point, see also Marselli and Vannini (1997).
20See, among others, Lodato (2006) and Cantone (2008) for evidence on the Maa and the Camorra, respectively.
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and the new business opportunities in the reconstruction sector after the devastating 1980 earthquake.
Insert Figure 2 here
The Italian penal code distinguishes between two categories of murders: (i) malicious or intentional
murders, whose executor had the deliberate will to commit the crime; and (ii) non-intentional or involuntary
murders, which are committed without an intentional purpose. Maa murders  i.e. the number of people
killed to achieve maaspurposes  are part of the intentional murders. Figure 2 shows the number of maa
murders reported by the police forces in Italy, both in absolute level and relative to (intentional) murders
unrelated to various maa organizations. All maa murders are considered, including those for which the
executor is prosecuted and those for which it remains unknown. The vertical bar marks the introduction of
the leniency program in 1991. Strikingly, it emerges an inverted U-shaped pattern with a maximum in 1991.
Before this year, murders followed an increasing trend culminating with 719 maa murders, corresponding
to roughly 50% of all other malicious murders. The trend is, instead, decreasing after the introduction of
the Italian leniency program. In 2007 the number of maa murders in Italy is down to 119, which is roughly
20% of the remaining murders.
Many explanations may be consistent with the increasing trend. For instance, a compelling possibility
relates to the evolution of public spending. In the rst half of the 1980s the Italian Government started
to concentrate public spending for infrastructures in the building sectorwhich is historically one of the
main business sources of maas, and thus one of the main reasons for which these organizations ght. For
instance, in Campania, Puglia, Calabria, and Sicily, the share of public spending for public buildings such
as houses, schools and hospitals with respect to total infrastructure spending, increased from 0.15 in 1986
up to 0.36 in 1999. This may explain the sharp increase in maa related murders before 1991 and suggests
that the introduction of the leniency program did have a role in inverting this tendency.
Of course, one may argue that the evolution of murder rates can be explained by a large scale war
involving clans of di¤erent clusters, each one against the others. In this perspective the drop after the
1991 might have occurred regardless of the program, simply because one gang won and the war ended. This
conjecture, however, is at odds with common knowledge. Historians and prosecutors have never documented
such large scale war: maa wars always happened within clusters and not between them.
Alternatively, one might argue that the aggregate evolution of murder rates just reects a maa war
within a single cluster characterized by a very large number of murders. This explanation is even less likely
in light of the evidence collected at province level. In fact, the inverted U-shaped evolution of murder rates
is due neither to a composite e¤ect nor to a specic maa association. This is evident from Figure 3, which
reports time series of maa murders across the four Italian provinces which have the largest records of maa
murders in 1991-92  i.e., Naples, Reggio Calabria, Catania and Caserta. Patterns very similar to the
aggregate one are evident. Arguably, it seems very unlikely that maa wars started and ended at the same
time within all four main maa-type criminal clusters.
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Insert Figure 3 here
As a nal remark we notice that the inverted U-shaped pattern of maa murders is peculiar to this
type of crime, that is it does not characterize non-maa murders or crimes that are usually unrelated to
maa activities, such as robberies in banks and post o¢ ces, as well as kidnappings whose ultimate purpose
is not extortion.21 As a matter of comparison, Figure 4 reports non-maa murders for regions historically
characterized by the least presence of organized crime, that is regions featuring at most one maa murder
per year on average. In this way we minimize the possibility that the police erroneously classied as not
related to maa activity some murders which instead had indeed a maa root. Figure 5 reports robberies
and kidnappings for Italy as a whole. The key aspect to note is that, in contrast to the evidence reported
above, in this case there is not a decreasing trend after 1991.22 Actually robberies and kidnappings exhibit
an increasing path during the 1990s.
Insert Figure 4 here
Insert Figure 5 here
4.2 Prosecution
Two distinct articles of the Italian penal code deal with organized crime  i.e., art. 416 refers to the crime
of criminal association, while art. 416-bis refers to the crime of maa-type association. These articles
regulate di¤erent types of crimes, but share some common features. In general, associations of at least three
people may be prosecuted either as criminal associations or as maa-type associations. Moreover, criminal
and maa-type associations often share the same kind of illicit activities. Nevertheless, the peculiarity of
maa-type associations, as stated by the third clause of art. 416-bis, is the exploitation of the force of
intimidation, the code of silence which derives from it and the perverse relationships that such associations
build with public o¢ cials. For our purpose, the key di¤erence is that the Italian legislator allowed the
possibility to enjoy lighter sentences in exchange of valuable information only to maa a¢ liates (art. 8 D.L.
13/05/1991 n.152), that is, relative to the feature of maa-type associations.
The Italian Statistical O¢ ce (ISTAT) provides data relative to the prosecutions for criminal and maa-
type association crimes, according to the year in which the judicial authority begins the penal action and
the province in which the crime has been committed. In particular, data are available since 1988 for the
country as whole and since 1993 at province level.
21Robberies and kidnappings are usually unrelated to maa associations. In contrast, kidnappings aimed at extortion may
be related to maas. Indeed, Reggio Calabria, the Calabrian area featuring the highest concentration of Ndrangheta clans, is
one of the four provinces  Torino, Reggio Calabria, Milano and Roma  with the largest numbers of kidnappings aimed at
extortion.
22 In Figure 4 FVG and TTA stand for Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige, respectively, two regions in the north
of Italy.
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Table 3 shows the top-5 provinces with most prosecutions for both types of crimes. As expected, the
provinces with the largest numbers of prosecutions for maa-type association crimes are all located in Sicily,
Calabria and Campania. In contrast, prosecutions for criminal association crimes are more dispersed across
the country.23 Naples and Palermo are the provinces with the highest numbers of prosecutions for maa;
incidentally, Naples is also the province featuring the greatest number of prosecutions for criminal association
crimes.
Insert Table 3 here
In Italy, police forces (namely, the Carabinieri, the Polizia and the Guardia di Finanza) generally report
crimes to prosecutors, who then decide whether to begin the prosecution procedure. Therefore, a crime
reported by the police does not necessarily result in prosecution. However, it may also result in more than
one prosecution if the investigation generates fresh information about other crimes. In particular, the
information provided by former accomplices participating in the accomplice-witness program is handled by
the judicial authority and not by the police. As a result, the ratio between the crimes prosecuted and those
reported by police forces appears as a good proxy for assessing the impact of the testimonies delivered by
the ipping criminals on the rate of prosecution.
Insert Figure 6 here
Let the variable PROSECUTION be the ratio between the number of prosecutions and the number of
crimes reported by the police forces. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of such variable in Italy from 1988
to 2005, for both maa-type association and criminal association crimes. The former crime is labelled as
Maas while the latter as Others.24 The main evidence is that while maa-related prosecutions are lower
than those connected to other similar crimes, they become higher around the time of the introduction of the
witness protection program for maa cooperators. PROSECUTION related to Maas registered a discrete
shift upward in 1992, and then increased up to values around 2; in contrast, PROSECUTION relative to
Others uctuated around 1.
Local data for PROSECUTION are only available since 1993, thus preventing us to perform a more
robust before-after analysis. Province-level data conrm, however, the evidence reported in Figure 6: the
upward trending evolution of PROSECUTION for Maas, after the introduction of the leniency program
in 1991, is not shared by the pattern of PROSECUTION for Others. A formal evidence supporting this
conclusion emerges by estimating the following equation:
PROSECUTION i;t = ai + ct+ "i;t;
23Note that the city of Milan is in the north of Italy while that of Rome is in the center of Italy. Calabria, Campania and
Sicily are all located in the South.
24A prosecution cannot last for more than a year before either a trial begins, if there is enough evidence, or the case is closed
 in few special cases an extra period of six months is admitted. Therefore, we construct our ratio by using the average value of
crimes reported to the judicial authority by the police forces in two adjacent years as the denominator. The qualitative results
do not change, however, if we consider only the contemporaneous year or the lagged one.
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where i and t refer, respectively, to province and year, ai is a province xed e¤ect, t is a deterministic trend,
and "i;t is an error term. OLS estimates of the parameter c, during 1993-2005, when PROSECUTION
refers to either Maas or Others are reported in Table 4. The column labelled Core-regions refers to a
restricted sample, which contains only the provinces belonging to Campania, Puglia, Calabria and Sicily
 i.e., those in which maa-type organizations have been historically more pervasive. The column labelled
Rest of Italyrefers, instead, to the other Italian provinces.
When estimates are based on all provinces in Italy, the trend coe¢ cient is estimated signicantly di¤erent
from zero  at 5% condence level  only when PROSECUTION for Maas is considered. If we restrict the
sample to the Core-regions, a signicant coe¢ cient also emerges relative to PROSECUTION for Others.
However, the point estimate is one-fourth of that related to PROSECUTION for Maas. In fact, the
coe¢ cient c when Maas (resp. Others) is considered is 0:116 (resp. 0:029); the corresponding t-ratio is
3:62 (resp. 2:15).25 Hence, during the years following the introduction of the leniency program regarding
maa-type association crime prosecutions of such crime increased at a rate much higher than that relative
to a similar crime.
Insert Table 4 here
Previous evidence is fully consistent with the idea that the leniency program have been positively a¤ecting
the probability of prosecutions of maa crimes. Unfortunately, the data available do not allow to test if
a structural break has taken place in 1991. The main drawback is that provincial data on prosecutions,
acquittals and whistle-blowing are only available after the introduction of the program. Moreover, even if
there was a break, in principle it may obey to the fact that resources were being shifted to ght the maa
around the same time of the introduction of the leniency program. The timing of the reform might have
been endogenous; prosecutors might have noticed the drop in cohesion and increase in hostility among rival
groups, and pushed for the introduction of the program precisely when this would have been most e¤ective
 i.e. when a large pool of disgruntled mobster were ready to defect. In this respect, it could be the case
that the accomplice-witness program was approved in conjunction with other changes in law enforcement.
Alternatively, the positive trend in prosecution rates for Maas could have started before the introduction
of the program, or even have caused the introduction of the program if, for example, it was driven by the
emergence of a new class of more aggressive prosecutors.
A more direct test of the e¤ectiveness of the leniency program, which is consistent with our model and
robust to previous potential criticisms, relates to the circumstance that the accomplice-witness program
should have induced a shift of prosecutions toward higher echelons of the organization. In fact, our model
predicts that if a soldier talks, the boss is more likely to fall. This is a peculiar prediction of our model which
is also less likely to be contaminated by simultaneous changes in resources. Although to take to the data
this prediction in a systematic manner is not feasible, a simple look at the very few available data shows
25As expected, there is no statistically signicant trend for the rest of Italy. We also test for the possibility of a structural
change after the the 2001 reform of the accomplice-witness program. The null hypothesis however is not statistically signicant
at 5% level.
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that this is exactly the case. Table 5 reports the number of latitanti pericolosi(bosses) arrested during
1995-2005 together with the average stock of people participating the program during the same period.26
Both variables are measured relative to the number of people prosecuted for maa association. It emerges
that there is a positive relationship between the number of bosses arrested and the pool of whistleblowers.
Insert Table 5 here
4.3 Propensity to whistle
A main prediction of our model is the negative correlation between the number of whistleblowers and the
acquittal rate. Since the 2000 yearly data are available about the number of maa accomplices who decide
to cooperate with public prosecutors, thus joining the accomplice-witness program. In particular, the data
allow to associate each accomplice with his former maa group  labelled as Camorra, Ndrangheta, Sacra
Corona Unita, Maa, or Others  as well as to the judicial district where he has been prosecuted. We
provide some evidence that the incentive to cooperate is related to the local legal environment. In particular,
variations in the proportion of acquittals in maa trials  across districts and through time  are exploited
to reveal any impact of the perceived probability of being convicted on the number of whistleblowers.
The correlation of interest is formally identied by the following regression:
WHISTLEBLOWERSi;t = a0 + a1ACQUITTANCEi;t + "i;t; (7)
where WHISTLEBLOWERSi;t is the number of maa a¢ liates prosecuted in the judicial district i and
entering the program in year t, while ACQUITTANCE i;t is the proportion of people involved in maa trials
who was acquitted  i.e., the number of acquittals divided by the sum of acquittals and convictions.27
We argue that the ACQUITTANCE variable may be a proxy for the perceived acquittal probability
upon which maa a¢ liates base their decision of blowing the whistle. Local di¤erences in such probability
account for our measure of di¤erences in the ine¢ ciency of the judicial system. This is because, a higher
level of ine¢ ciency is likely to imply a higher value of the perceived acquittal probability. Thus, under the
assumption that ACQUITTANCE i;t is uncorrelated with "i;t, the coe¢ cient a1 identies the e¤ect of the
ine¢ ciency of the judicial system on the number of ipping criminals: we expect a negative sign for this
coe¢ cient.
However, we cannot neglect a possible reverse causality between WHISTLEBLOWERS and ACQUIT-
TANCE since the cross-sectional variability of the former variable, which is partly due to historical di¤er-
ences among maa groups, may a¤ect that of the latter. Moreover, nation-wide correlation between the
two variables may arise because of accidental correlation due to the short time span. Thus, it might be
reasonable to assume that:
"i;t = vi + t + i;t;
26We do not report data for the maa cluster Sacra Corona Unita because of the very few number of bosses arrested (just 2).
27The crimes considered are those regulated by the Codice di Procedura Penale art. 51, comma 3 bis.
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where vi is a district-specic time-invariant component, possibly correlated with ACQUITTANCE i;t; and t
is a time-specic e¤ect. We take to the data this specication of the error term "i;t in two alternative manners:
by including district dummies among the regressors of equation (7) or by considering rst-di¤erences of the
variables of interest. In any case we always allow for year dummies. By allowing for district dummies, we
control for maa-specic xed factors, so that only within-district variability in whistleblowers contributes to
the estimation of the acquittances e¤ect. When rst-di¤erences are considered, instead, the time-invariant
component is removed from the estimated equation. The year dummies may also control for reverse causality
at aggregate level and nation-wide variations in the e¢ ciency of the judicial system.28 Hence, overall our
strategy should address the most likely endogeneity concern.
Table 6 reports the main results relative to all judicial districts characterized by at least 1 crime per year
on average for ACCUSATION  i.e., more than 8 crimes during the period  and to the subset of the 10
districts strongly troubled by the 4 main maa groups. The time span is from 2000 to 2007. The rst two
columns rely on OLS with district dummies while the third and fourth columns refer to the rst-di¤erence
specication. The estimated coe¢ cient a1 is always negative and it is statistically signicant (5% level)
when we restrict the sample to the core districts; in this case the point estimates are quite stable across
specications. Hence, as argued above, this suggests a positive relationship between the e¢ ciency of the
judicial system, as reected by a higher conviction frequency, and the number of whistleblowers.
Previous conclusion is robust to the introduction of a number of controls. OLS estimates of a1 very
similar to those reported in table 6 are obtained by controlling for MURDER, the ratio between the number
of maa trials completed in a given year and the number of trials pending at the beginning of the year, as
well as the total number of whistleblowers in the accomplice-witness program at the beginning of every year
(results not reported).
Insert Table 6 here
Allowing for xed e¤ects controls for the main channel of endogeneity. However, if the information pro-
vided by whistleblowers at time t eventually a¤ects the outcomes of future trials at t+ s, then there can be
some feedback from current WHISTLEBLOWERS to future ACQUITTANCE. In this circumstance, both
the dummy variables and rst-di¤erence approaches might deliver biased estimates. To take this problem
into account, we exploit the prediction of our theoretical model and estimate an IV regression relying on
the number of public o¢ cials (per capita) convicted for bribes at regional level, CORRUPTION. Actually,
regressing ACQUITTANCE on CORRUPTION lagged emerges a negative and statistically signicant
coe¢ cient (p-value 0:014), which is robust to the inclusion of year dummies, the lagged level of ACQUIT-
TANCE and the above set of controls. Thus, convictions for corruption and maa related crimes tend to be
28A reasonable possibility is that the fraction of acquittals in maa trials changes systematically depending on media coverage
or political pressure. In principle, a high fraction could be due to very aggressive justice  because, for instance, the prosecutors
are under strong political pressure  and a low one could be due to very cautious prosecutors, that only bring a case when it is
really obvious that the mobster is guilty. Such sources of variations in enforcement mainly trigger o¤ changes in ACQUITTANCE
during the time for the overall country. Thus, such an e¤ect is to a large extent captured by the time dummies.
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positively related as an increase of the former variable anticipates an expansion of maa convictions. Given
that, the rst-di¤erence version of equation (7) has been re-estimated by using ACQUITTANCE i;t 1 and
CORRUPTION i;t 1 as instruments for ACQUITTANCE i;t. The IV estimate of a1 is still negative and
substantially higher in absolute value than the corresponding OLS one:  26:12 (p-value less than 0:05).
The IV regression is indeed consistent with the possibility that corruption undermines the e¢ ciency of
the judicial system. If past convictions for corruption deter corruption itself in the future, then the higher
is the number of convictions in the past, the larger is the current level of e¢ ciency of the judicial system
and (ceteris paribus) the lower should be the share of acquittances in maa trials. In a nutshell, as maa
convictions tend to be more frequent after an increase of corruption convictions, this pattern supports the
idea that maa trials, and thus the incentive to whistle, may be a¤ected by the di¤usion of corruption.29
Again the results are robust to the controls mentioned above.
5 Related Literature
Our analysis builds on, and is related to the literature on antitrust law enforcement studying the e¤ects
of leniency programs on cartels formation in oligopoly. The rst paper explicitly addressing the e¤ects
of leniency programs, and emphasizing their benecial role, is Motta and Polo (2003).30 They analyze
the impact of reduced nes for cartel members that inform the antitrust authority and show that it can be
e¢ cient to reduce nes even when the authority has already started an investigation, but has not yet obtained
evidence of misbehavior. However, this paper takes leniency rules as exogenous, while the identication of
the optimal policy is a key point in our analysis. Following Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2003), we also take into
account the role of rewards to former criminals by studying their determinants and social value. As in their
models, we also nd that rewards are sometimes optimal. However, both these papers do not establish a
link between internal cohesion of cartels and rewards, a prediction that, according to the evidence discussed
in Section 2, is more specic to criminal organizations.
Another related paper is Chen and Rey (2007), which study the optimal design of leniency programs in
a standard oligopoly framework. As Chen and Rey, we also take a mechanism design approach to leniency,
but in a very di¤erent context: in contrast to them, we focus on leniency awarded after the investigation
is opened (in this sense our analysis is closer to Motta and Polo, 2003). Aubert et al. (2006), analyze a
model where leniency programs could have a positive social value insofar as they create a conict of interests
between members of di¤erent organizations (cartels or rms). They also discuss informally the idea that
leniency programs could be desirable insofar as these laws generate conicts between the members of the
same organizations  e.g., rms. Our model is built precisely on this intuition but, in contrast to them, it
29Of course, we recognize that the result is puzzling if one interprets high numbers of corruption convictions in the past as a
proxy for high level of corruption di¤usion afterwards.
30Our paper also relates to the literature on plea bargaining, where the prosecutor that is concerned with achieving the
greatest possible punishment, uses plea bargaining as a means to save scarce resources by avoiding taking all defendants to
trial (Landes, 1971). More recently, Kobayashi (1992) interprets plea bargaining as a device through which a prosecutor buys
information. See also the recent survey by Gazal-Ayal and Riza (2009). However, all these papers do not establish a link
between internal cohesion of cartels and rewards, which is more specic to criminal organizations.
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fully develops the formal arguments, and it identies the main trade-o¤s at stake by shedding novel light on
the available historical and empirical evidence. In particular, we make explicit the link between the degree
of internal cohesion of a criminal organization and the social planner optimal policy.
Besides the leniency literature, our paper also relates to the literature on organized crime. This literature
rst focused on welfare comparisons between monopoly and competitive supply of bads see for instance
Buchanan (1973) and Backhaus (1979). More recently, Jennings (1984), Polo (1995), Konrad and Skaperdas
(1997) and Garoupa (2000) have modelled criminal organizations as vertical structures where a principal
must discipline its members.31 We build on this literature by recognizing that members at various levels of
the criminal chain have di¤erent bargaining power and, perhaps more importantly, face di¤erent prosecution
risks, as they may be treated in di¤erent ways by the law, as well as by studying the role of accomplice-
witness programs as a tool to exacerbate conicts within criminal organizations.
In a recent theory paper Piccolo and Immordino (2012) assume that whistleblowers may have incentives
to distort the information they provide, accusing innocents and delaying or derailing the investigations for
good. Here, we kept theses issues aside in order to compare in the clearest possible way the main models
predictions.
Our analysis also shares important features with the literature on corruption.32 Stemming from Becker
and Stigler (1974) the law and enforcement literature has acknowledged that bribery reduces punishment
and thus deterrence. To contrast this fall in deterrence, they propose the payment of e¢ ciency wages to
prevent bribe taking.33 Bowles and Garoupa (1997) focus on the e¤ects of bribery on the optimal allocation
of public resources and they show that the maximal ne may not be optimal.34 Polinsky and Shavell
(2001) consider the dilution of deterrence caused by corruption not only due to bribing by criminals but
also extortion of the innocent by enforcers. They propose rewards for corruption reports to mitigate the
breakdown of deterrence. In a recent paper Kugler, Verdier and Zenou (2005) analyze an oligopoly model
of criminal organizations, where the competing clans also engage in corruption. Di¤erently from Bowles
and Garoupa (1997), where a higher ne may deter crime but will encourage corruption, they nd that the
maximal ne is not optimal because it results in more rather than less crime. The role of corruption is
not only in diluting deterrence but also as a strategic complement to crime  i.e., as a catalyst to crime.
Finally, Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) highlight the potential perverse e¤ect that awarding leniency to
wrongdoers that self-report may have on opportunities for illegal cooperation. Our approach contributes to
this literature in that we focus on the interaction between organized crime, corrupted public o¢ cials and
leniency programs, showing that the fraction of criminals that cooperate and the optimal amnesty rate are
both lower in the presence of a less corrupt justice.
The evidence presented on the evolution of prosecution rates and maa murders is closely related to,
and consistent with, the evaluation of the U.S. leniency program introduced by the Department of Justice in
1993 to ght cartels performed in Miller (2009). Our approach di¤ers from Millers in one main key respect:
31See also Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995), Mansour et al. (2006) and Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008).
32See the survey by Polinsky and Shavell (2001) and more recently the one by Rose-Ackerman (2010).
33Besley and McLaren (1993) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) also propose e¢ ciency wages to deter bribery.
34See also Basu et al. (1992), Marjit and Shi (1998).
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contrary to many other crimes  e.g., cartels  the number of measured murders is close to the number
of murders e¤ectively committed. Thus, discovered murders are representative of the entire population,
which eliminates the usual di¢ culty due to the confounding e¤ect of the increased rate of detection (on
the deterrence e¤ect see also Ehrlich, 1981, Levitt, 1998, Harrington, 2008, and Harrington and Chang,
2009, among others). The fact that murders (di¤erently from many other crimes) are measured correctly
has been underlined by Marselli and Vannini (1997) in their study of Italian crime where they estimate a
crime equation taking into account a silent feature of the Italian context, that is the presence of criminal
organizations.35 In another recent empirical study, Brenner (2009) nds evidence that the 1996 EU leniency
program has provided incentives to reveal information on criminal activities.
Finally, one of the main aspects that characterizes a criminal organization in our model is that the boss
does not commit the crime but delegates its execution to the agent. This is clearly only one among the many
other aspects of criminal organizations. Another aspect is, for instance, the fact that criminal organizations
are hierarchical networks of relationships. In particular, in the network literature, there is a large debate
about targeting key players in criminal organizations. Ballester et al. (2006, 2010), for instance, dene
the key player as the criminal who, once removed, leads to the highest aggregate crime reduction. This
aspect is not present in our model where the criminal organization is represented simply as a principal-agent
relationship. However, to the best of our knowledge, the link between leniency programs and key players
has not yet been explored in this literature. We wish to address this new issue in future work.
6 Concluding remarks
Building on new evidence about Italian criminal organizations we have identied both the determinants and
the main e¤ects of accomplice-witness programs. Our analysis suggests that inducing former criminals to
cooperate with the justice is particularly useful when the prosecution system is poorly e¢ cient, criminal
organizations have strong ties with public o¢ cials and the information provided by ipping criminals is
reliable. Consistent with the available historical evidence, our theoretical model suggests that the degree
of cohesion between the members of a criminal organization is key for the design of the optimal leniency
policy: rewards or even monetary benets to informants are indeed sometimes necessary in the presence of
organizations featuring strong cohesion between their members. The empirical evidence supports the idea
that accomplice-witness regulations have a positive e¤ect on prosecution as well as on deterrence. Moreover
in line with our model prediction, the Italian experience seems to suggest that the inow of accomplices is
negatively correlated with a proxy of the ine¢ ciency of the judicial system.
35However, their panel dataset of Italian regions for the period 1980 to 1989 gives no insights on the e¤ect of the 1991 leniency
program.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Di¤erentiating the regulators objective in L with respect to b yields:
R0l(b) =  (   )Spg(b) + (1 G(b)) = hh(b)  (   )Spi g(b);
where under A1 the term in brackets is strictly decreasing. It follows that the regulators objective is quasi-
concave in b. Furthermore, R0l   =  (   )Spg   < 0 and R0l() = h()  (   )Spg() > 0 under
A2. It follows that the optimum is interior and thus characterized by the rst-order condition (4). 
Proof of Proposition 2. The optimality condition (4) determines the proportion of informants:
1 G(b) = 1 G(h 1((   )Sp));
where h (:) is decreasing under A1. This proportion of informants thus depends only upon (and increases
with) (   Sp); that is, it increases with  and Sp and decreases if instead  or  increases.
From (3) and (4) we have:
b() = (1     p)Sa + L = h 1((   )Sp);
or
 = 1  p  h
 1((   )Sp)  L
Sa
:
It follows that  increases with , Sp and L, and decreases when p,  or  increases. As for Sa, the
conclusion follows from:
@
@Sa
=
h 1((   )Sp)  L
S2a
=
1  p  
Sa
;
which concludes the proof. 
A simple two-whistleblowers model. In this section we extend the baseline model by considering the
case where the criminal organization is formed by a boss and two (ex ante identical) fellows (each indexed
by i = 1; 2) who jointly commit the crime and decide non-cooperatively whether to blow the whistle.
The objective is to study how the optimal amnesty is a¤ected by the presence of multiple agents owning
complementary information that can be used against the boss. For brevity, and with no loss of insights, we
assume that  = 0 and  =  = p = 1. We also posit that each fellows personal cost of facing the trial (i,
i = 1; 2) is uniformly distributed over the support [0; 1]. The timing of the game is as follows.
t=1 Uncertainty about R resolves and the boss decides whether to commit the crime; if he chooses not to
commit the crime, the game ends; otherwise the principal pays the wage wi to each agent i once the
crime is committed.
t=2 An investigation opens. Agents learn their personal costs of facing the trial (i.e., each fellow i learns
only i but not  i) and, if a leniency program is in place, they simultaneously and non-cooperatively
decide whether to blow the whistle. Depending on the legal regime, the trial uncertainty resolves, and
sanctions (including the retaliation loss) are imposed.
As before, we assume that when only one agent blows the whistle, he obtains a discount , the boss is
convicted with probability  < 1, while the agent who has remained loyal to the organization is convicted
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with probability 1. Moreover, following Chen and Rey (2007), we assume that when both fellows blow the
whistle, each enjoys half of the full discount  and the boss is convicted with probability . The parameter
 2 [1;min2; 1=	] captures the degree of complementary between the information released by the two
whistleblowers  i.e., if  = 1 there is no complementarity at all and the bossconviction risk is the same
as when only one fellow cheats; if instead  > 1 the bossconviction risk is higher when both fellows cheat
and this di¤erence becomes larger the higher is  (for  = 1= the boss is convicted with certainty if both
talk; for  = 2 the probability of convicting the boss doubles when both agents cheat relative to the case
of a single cheat). Consistently with the previous analysis we assume that disloyalty is punished and that a
whistleblower incurs the retribution loss L.
Since the fellows are ex ante identical, we look for a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium: each agent
blows the whistle if and only if his cost i of facing the trial exceeds the threshold b. Hence, agent i prefers
to blow the whistle if and only if the following condition is met:
L+ Pr( i  b) (1  )Sa + Pr( i > b) 1  
2

Sa  Sa + i, (A1)
where the left-hand side is the expected loss from blowing the whistle (which depends on the behavior of
the other agent), while the right-hand side is the cost of remaining loyal to the organization. Taken as an
equality, condition (A1) identies the threshold b.
Hence, the wage paid by the boss to each agent is:
w(b) = Z b
0
[Sa + i] di +
Z 1
b
h
Sa + bi di;
while the bossexpected sanction is:
C(b) = 2b(1  b)Sp + (1  b)2Sp
The Legislators maximization program is thus
maxb2[0;1]
n
C(b) + 2w(b)o = maxb2[0;1]
(
2b(1  b)Sp + (1  b)2Sp + 2"Z b
0
[Sa + i] di +
Z 1
b
h
Sa + bi di#) ;
whose rst-order necessary and su¢ cient condition is
2
h
Sp(1  2b)  Sp(1  b) + (1  b)i = 0: (A2)
This condition suggests that there are again costs and benets associated with a leniency policy. As in
the baseline model, a too lenient policy (i.e., a low b) may induce the boss to commit the crime more often
because it reduces the agentsreservation wage. But, on the other hand, it may introduce ex-post conict
between the members of the organization that is detrimental to the boss insofar as it raises his conviction
probability. Hence, both the dark and the bright sides of leniency discussed above are still at play here.
Notice that at b = 1 this derivative is negative and equals to  2Sp, while at b = 0 it equals to
2
 
1  Sp (   1)

, which is positive if 1 > Sp (   1). Hence, 1 > Sp (   1) guarantees the existence of
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an interior solution to the Legislators problem. Solving (A2) with respect to b, the optimal policy requires
b = 1  Sp (   1)
1  Sp (   2)
2 (0; 1) :
Using condition (A1), it follows that b = 2L  Sa
2 + Sa
;
so that the optimal amnesty is
 () =
Sp + L  1
Sa
+
 
L+ Sp   1  2 (2  ) Sp

Sp 
(3  2) Sp + 2

Sa
;
where, recall that the rst term of the above equation, Sp+L 1Sa , is the optimal amnesty that one would
obtain in the single-agent organization derived more generally in equation (5). It is easy to show that  ()
is increasing in   i.e., criminals that disclose complementary information are rewarded more intensively
 and that
 () >
Sp + L  1
Sa
,  > 2  Sp + L  1
2Sp
:
When  is not too large (i.e.,  ! 1) dealing with two informants has a relatively small impact on the boss
conviction risk. Hence, the Legislator has no incentive to induce both fellows to talk simultaneously, which
requires setting a low amnesty. Indeed, even if each of them talks less often, it is optimal to slightly reduce
the amnesty because the organization is larger and (ceteris paribus) the probability of whistleblowing is
higher than in the single-agent case. When instead  is away from 1, the Legislator wants to increase the
amnesty because convicting the boss when both fellows talk is more likely than with a single whistleblower.
Essentially, maximizing the probability of having more than one informant, requires to grant excessive
amnesty  relative to the single-agent case. 
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Appendix 2: Data
Maa (malicious or intentional) murders: number of maa murders reported by the police forces to
the judicial authority. Source: Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Statistiche giudiziarie penali (several
issues).
Malicious or intentional murders: total number of malicious murders, for reasons di¤erent than maa,
reported by the police forces to the judicial authority. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie penali (various
issues).
Robberies in banks and post o¢ ces: number of robberies in banks and post o¢ ces reported by the
police forces to the judicial authority. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie penali (various issues).
Kidnappings: number of kidnappings excluding those related to extortion reported by the police forces to
the judicial authority. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie penali (various issues).
Prosecution of maa-type association cases: number of cases of maa association (art. 416-bis of the
Italian penal code) prosecuted. Each prosecution is recorded according to the starting year, that is when
the judicial authority begins the penal action. For each year the spatial distribution reects the province
where the crime prosecuted is presumed to be committed. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various
issues).
People prosecuted for maa crimes: total number of people prosecuted because of maa crimes as
indicated by the Codice di Procedura Penale, art. 51 comma 3 bis. Source: Italian Department of Justice.
Prosecution of criminal association cases: number of cases of criminal association (art. 416 of the
Italian penal code) prosecuted. Each prosecution is recorded according to the starting year, that is when
the judicial authority begins the penal action. For each year the spatial distribution reects the province
where the crime prosecuted is presumed to be committed. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie (various
issues).
Maa-type association accusation: number of cases of maa association (art. 416-bis of the Italian
penal code) reported by the police forces to the judicial authority. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie
(various issues).
Criminal association crime accusation: number of cases of criminal association (art. 416 of the Italian
penal code) reported by the police forces to the judicial authority. Source: ISTAT, Statistiche giudiziarie
(various issues).
Whistleblowers: number of former maa a¢ liates participating to the Italian accomplice-witness protec-
tion program. The dataset associates each accomplice with his former criminal organization (labelled as
Camorra, Ndrangheta, Sacra Corona Unita and Maa) and the judicial district of prosecution. Source:
Commissione parlamentare dinchiesta sul fenomeno della criminalità organizzata maosa o similare, tech-
nical report (various issues).
People convicted for maa crimes and people acquitted: the number of people involved in trials
 relative to maa crimes as indicated by the Codice di Procedura Penale, art. 51, comma 3 bis  who
end up to be convicted or acquitted. Spatial variability: 26 judicial districts. Source: Italian Department of
Justice.
Trials pending and completed: the number of trials pending at the initial year or completed during the
year  relative to maa crimes as indicated by the Codice di Procedura Penale, art. 51, comma 3 bis.
Spatial variability: 26 judicial districts. Source: Italian Department of Justice.
Municipality: local governments dismissed by the central government because of ties between administra-
tors and the Maa either through direct inltrations of mobsters into the local administrations or by indirect
inuence. Source: Commissione parlamentare dinchiesta sul fenomeno della criminalità organizzata maosa
o similare, technical report (various issues).
Corruption: Public o¢ cials convicted because of bribery. Source: Alto Commissariato per la Lotta alla
Corruzione. Data are relative to Italian regions during 1996-2006. Note that according to the Italian Penal
Code, corruption crimes may be only committed by public o¢ cials and persons in charge of a public service.
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Table 1: Convictions for mafia affiliation
1982-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 1982-2001
Campania 970 332 420 1722 (31.7%)
Calabria 150 168 229 547 (10.0%)
Puglia 35 245 396 676 (12.4%)
Sicily 229 681 1214 2124 (39.0%)
Rest of Italy 61 202 111 374 (6.9%)
Total 1445 1628 2370 5443 (100.0%)
Note: The table reports the total number of people con-
victed for maa (art. 416-bis).
Table 2: Whistleblowers and Confiscation
Whistleblowers Conscation
2008 1992-2007
Camorra 294 35% 3,018 52%
Ndrangheta 101 12% 308 5%
SCU 95 11% 190 3%
Sicilian Maa 239 29% 1,878 32%
Others 104 13% 431 7%
Total 833 100% 5,826 100%
Note: Whistleblowers denotes the number of former maa
accomplices who were taking part the protection program
at the end of 2008. Conscation denotes the value (million
of euros) of total assets conscated.
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Table 3: Top-5 provinces with most prosecutions
Maa-type association (art. 416-bis) Criminal association (art. 416)
Provinces (Regions) Prosecutions Provinces (Regions) Prosecutions
Palermo (Sicily) 476 Napoli (Campania) 1306
Napoli (Campania) 401 Roma (Lazio) 1125
Catania (Sicily) 286 Milano (Lombardia) 720
Catanzaro (Calabria) 262 Palermo (Sicily) 422
Caltanisetta (Sicily) 255 Bari (Puglia) 382
Note: The table reports the total number of crimes prosecuted during 1993-
2005, relative to artt. 416 and 416-bis of the Italian penal code.
Table 4: Crimes Prosecuted after Leniency
Maa-type associations: art. 416-bis Criminal associations: art. 416
Italy Core-regions Rest of Italy Italy Core-regions Rest of Italy
Trend 0.053* 0.116** -0.019 0.015 0.029* 0.011
(2.05) (3.62) (-0.52) (1.23) (2.15) (0.69)
N 620 281 339 1212 286 926
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of the number of crimes prosecuted to the
number of crimes accusated by the police forces. For any t, the latter is the average of
current and lagged accusations. Provincial dummies (not reported) are allowed. Time
span: 1993-2005. Standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and intraprovince
serial correlation (t-values are in parentheses). Signicant coe¢ cients are indicated
by * p<0.05 and ** p<0.01.
Table 5: Bosses arrested and Whistleblowers
Bosses Whistleblowers
Camorra 12.54 20.43
Sicilian Maa 20.29 24.54
Ndrangheta 36.10 26.53
Note: The table reports the total number of
bosses arrested (per 1000 people prosecuted
for maa association) and the average stock
of whistleblowers (per 100 people prosecuted
for maa association) through 1995-2005.
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Table 6: Incentives to become whistleblowers
Levels specication First-di¤erence specication
All Core All Core Core
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
ACQUITTANCE -1.85 -9.09* -2.35 -8.44** -26.12*
(-1.36) (-2.03) (-1.49) (-2.59) (-2.46)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Excluded Instruments 8.92
(F-test)
Hansen J statistic 0.38
(0.53)
Obs.-Districts 133-17 80-10 115-17 70-10 70-10
Note: The dependent variable is the number of whistleblowers. Results re-
ported in the rst two columns are based on variables in levels allowing for
judicial district dummies; results reported in the last three columns are based
instead on rst-di¤erence variables. Allrefers to all judicial districts charac-
terized by at least 1 crime per year on average for ACCUSATION while Core
refers to the subset of the 10 districts strongly troubled by the 4 main maa
groups. The t-values are in parentheses (standard errors are robust to het-
eroskedasticity); signicant coe¢ cients are indicated by * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
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Figure 1: Game Tree
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Figure 2: Mafia murders in Italy
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Figure 3: Provinces with most mafia-related murders
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Figure 4: Murders unrelated to mafias
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Figure 5: Robberies and kidnappings in Italy
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Figure 6: Prosecution against organized crime in Italy
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